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I. Introduction  
The state of the compliance function today is the culmination of a roughly twenty year 
expansion fueled by new laws, regulations, and agency guidance.1  The provenance of these 
programs and systems of control currently advocated by regulators are diverse.  Fundamentally, 
however, compliance programs are designed to monitor and deter wrongdoing within an 
organization through the implementation of policies and procedures.2   Enforcement falls “within 
the purview of numerous federal and state agencies,” and as result, compliance programs are an 
amalgamation that reflect the prescriptions and preferences of multiple agencies with varying 
degrees of civil and criminal oversight authority. 3 
 In response to the deluge of new compliance-related laws and guidance, companies must 
grapple with defining the role of the compliance function and determining where within the 
organization the department should be located.  This debate extends beyond the common 
concerns that accompany corporate resource allocation because of the effect that the compliance 
department has on the legal position of an organization and because government has 
demonstrated certain preferences.  In large organizations, the compliance department either 
reports to the general counsel (GC) in some subordinate position, or exists apart from the GC as 
an equal, board-level reporting entity.  The much more limited resources of smaller organizations 
commonly necessitate that the duties of the GC and CCO to be located in a single office and/or 
person. 4  
                                                          
1 Michele DeStefno,  Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 87 (2014). 
2 Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 960 (2009). 
3 Id. at 958. 
4 Michele DeStefno, supra note 1, at 72. 
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This paper will begin with an explanation of the legal sources of corporate compliance 
and why it has experienced such explosive growth over the last decade.  This section will also 
explain the basic divide between the government and industry over whether the corporate 
compliance program should be compartmentalized.  It will the examine the debate over whether 
the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) should report to the General Counsel (GC), or whether the 
CCO should be a standalone senior-level position reporting directly to the Board of Directors 
(hereinafter, “the Board”).  After discussing the respective compliance roles and reporting 
obligations of the GC, the CCO, the Board and senior management, this paper will examine the 
risks and benefits of both a consolidated and a bifurcated reporting structure.  This paper 
concludes that adopting an independent reporting structure, and empowering each with executive 
authority, is the preferred structure for satisfying a company’s legal, ethical, and compliance 
obligations.  
II. Legal Sources of Corporate Compliance 
A corporation is a legal entity that has that authority to act as a single person.5  Since the 
“corporate person” is a fictitious legal construct, under a respondeat superior standard of 
corporate criminal and civil liability, the corporation assumes liability for the illegal and/or 
negligent acts of its employees.6  To mitigate the effects of such liability, it is prudent for 
management to develop and implement systems that are ordered first, to deterring misconduct; 
and second, to identifying any residual malfeasance.  Identifying misconduct, illustrates that an 
organization is committed to cultivating ethical norms and allows a company to cooperate with 
any government investigation.7   
                                                          
5  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
6 See John, Hasnas, Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 507 (2008). 
7 Id. 
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The sources for corporate compliance are the common law, regulatory guidance, civil 
settlement and deferred prosecution agreements between industry and enforcement agencies, , 
and the federal sentencing guidelines.   
A. In re Caremark 
In In re Caremark, a 1996 shareholder derivate suit, the Court of Chancery of Delaware 
held that directors are obligated to ensure that their corporation maintains an effective 
“information and reporting system . . . and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, 
in theory, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal 
standards.”8  Under this standard, directors possess a duty to ensure the implementation of an 
effective compliance program, however, the composition of that program remains a question of 
business judgment.9  In Caremark shareholders brought suit against the directors alleging that 
their failure to monitor the business practices of the organization effectively allowed fraudulent 
behavior that resulted in a criminal indictment and significant fines.10  The final settlement 
against the organization was “huge” by standards of the time however, the court held that a 
demonstration of a good faith effort to implement an effective compliance program insulated the 
directors  personal liability for breach of their fiduciary duty of care.11  In Stone v. Ritter, the 
Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Caremark test as the standard under which directors can 
satisfy their duty of care by establishing, in good faith, a system of reporting and monitoring.12  
Importantly, corporate law does not impose liability where illegal behavior occurs despite best 
efforts at effective compliance. 
                                                          
8 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 960. 
11 Id. at 971. 
12 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
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As a result, while Caremark is the seminal case of director liability to shareholders for 
failure to monitor, a breadth of other civil and criminal laws punish wrongful corporate behavior 
irrespective of the presence of corporate oversight, taking monitoring into account only at the 
penalty stage.13  Professor Bullard notes that the liability directors and managers face as a result 
of administrative penalties and criminal charges is greater “than by the prospect of private 
Caremark liability under state corporate law.”14  Even while most cases involving corporate 
misdeeds settle, it is the federal sentencing guidelines that apply to business organizations that 
better inform directors performance of their oversight responsibilities.15   
B. United States Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, DOJ Memorandum, and 
US Attorney’s Manual 
 
First promulgated in 1991, the United States Organizational Sentencing Guidelines seek 
to encourage organizations and their agents to develop and implement “internal mechanism for 
preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”16  The Sentencing Guidelines reflect that 
organizations  act through their agents and thus are vicariously liable for the actions of those 
agents.17  To encourage greater self-policing by organizations, the Sentencing Guidelines offer 
incentives to organizations to adopt compliance programs to prevent, detect, and sanction 
criminal misconduct.18  First, the Sentencing Guidelines enumerate components of an “effective 
compliance program,”19 And direct that prosecutors and judges should employ an assessment of 
the effectiveness of the compliance program in determining the organization’s fine20 .21  There 
                                                          
13 Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 25 (2013). 
14 Id. at 27. 
15 In re Caremark, supra note 8. 
16 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 8, introductory cmt. (2015). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at §8B2.1. 
20 Id. at §8C2.4. 
21 Id. at §8C2.5. 
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fine may be mitigated if the organization had an effective compliance program in place at the 
time of the misconduct,22 and/or if the organization self-reported the offense to the appropriate 
government authority.23   
In September of 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates issued what is commonly 
known as the “Yates Memo,”24  which represents the latest in a series of DOJ memorandum 
regarding prosecution of corporations.  This began in 1999 with the “Holder Memo,”25 providing 
general guidance on bringing charges against corporations.  This guidance was further developed 
in the “Thompson Memo”26 (2003), the “McNulty Memo”27 (2006), and the “Filip Memo”28 
(2008).  The guidance contained in these memos sets forth principles for charging corporations29 
that DOJ incorporated into the U.S. Attorney Memo’s Manual in the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, and are now binding on all federal prosecutors.30 
The Yates Memo precludes corporate settlements that are not accompanied by holding 
individual employees who engaged in the illegal behavior  Because corporate crime cannot occur 
absent the acts of its employees, individual accountability is the new and important lever through 
                                                          
22 Id. at §8C2.5(f)(1). 
23 Id. at §8C2.5(g)(1). 
24 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.  
25 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-
corps.PDF 
26 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003),  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojth
omp.authcheckdam.pdf. 
27 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,  Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf.  
28 Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, on Principles of Federal Prosecution 
of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-
memo-08282008.pdf.  
29 Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 101 
(2016). 
30 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-28.210 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/usam/united-states-
attorneys-manual. 
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which to the government seeks to obtain change in corporate behavior.31  The memo sets forth 
guidance, in the form of six principles, on the means by which culpable individuals are to be held 
accountable in corporate cases.32  Importantly, this guidance applies to criminal as well as civil 
enforcement actions undertaken by DOJ.33  Consistent among the principles and the document as 
a whole is the instruction that the DOJ considers sentence mitigation contingent on an 
organization’s disclosure of misconduct and cooperation with any investigation.34   
The US Attorney’s Manual gives prosecutors the discretion, in certain instances, to 
choose whether or not to prosecute offenders for violations of federal criminal law.35  
Prosecutors should consider, among other things, the deterrent effect of prosecution and its 
impact of the public.36 Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) “occupy an important middle 
ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation.”37  When 
DOJ enters into a DPA with an organization, a prosecutor typically brings but does not prosecute 
charges against an organization.  After the organization pays the agreed upon monetary 
settlement and successfully completes the terms of the agreement, the prosecutor drops the 
charges.38  DPAs are intended to “promote compliance with applicable law and to prevent 
recidivism.”  DPAs often require the rehabilitated company to adopt specific compliance 
programs, which has the effect of making them more complaint.  Compliance programs 
                                                          




35 U.S. Attorneys' Manual , supra note 30, at § 9-28.200. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 30, at § 9-28.1100. 
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frequently adopt as “best practice”  elements of deferred prosecution agreements into their 
compliance programs.39 
C. HHS OIG Corporate Integrity Agreements and DOJ Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements 
 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the administrative agency that 
regulates organizations, providers, and individuals in the healthcare industry.  HHS provides 
instruction for crafting and implementing compliance programs through agency regulations and 
guidance.40  In addition, the Medicare Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 
gave HHS the discretion to exclude any individual or entity that engages in fraud and other 
misconduct.41  In the mid 1990’s HHS Officer of Inspector General (OIG), began entering into 
Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) with organizations under investigation for violations of 
the False Claim Act.42  OIG now utilizes CIAs to resolve investigations arising under a variety of 
civil false claim circumstances.43  In exchange for OIG’s agreement not to pursue exclusion from 
Medicare, Medicaid, or other Federal Health Services, organizations agree to adopt the elements 
set forth in the agreement.44  CIAs are tailored to the specific organization, however, they contain 
many common features, for example the obligation to hire a compliance officer, retain an 
independent review organization, and establish a confidential disclosure program.45   
                                                          
39 See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The 
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1138 (2006). 
40 See e.g. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Mfrs., 68 FED. REG. 23731 (May 5, 2003), Office 
of Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. & Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n., The Health Care 
Director’s Compliance Duties: A Continued Focus of Attention and Enforcement (2011), 
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/docs/health_care_directors_compliance_duties.pdf. 
41 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7(b), See Tracy D. Hubbell, Amy C. Mauro, & Dan Moar, Health Care Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 603, 657 (2006). 
42 Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitoriship Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 
679, 686 (2009). 
43 See Dept. of Health & Human Serv's, Office of Inspector Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreements, 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp (last visited April 12, 2016) 
(describing history and features of CIAs). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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CIAs are not law, but rather are agreements entered into outside the judicial system for 
the purpose of avoiding more serious punitive actions.  However, “CIAs can impose more 
rigorous compliance standards upon a corporation than the law itself doesIn effect, CIAs create 
“private legislation” promulgated by an administrative agency over the assenting organization.46  
While only binding on the organization that has entered into the agreement, CIAs communicate 
what HHS deems to be best practices, which leads to the adoption of “industry-wide standards 
that may never have been approved by the legislature.”47  
DOJ uses deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs)48 to obtain corporate cooperation and 
get offending organizations to change their behavior to help mitigate future misconduct.49  Use 
of DPAs have increased over time for a variety of reasons, including concern about the collateral 
effect that large judgment or criminal conviction will have an organization.50  However, the main 
driver of DPAs is the desire to obtain an organization’s full cooperation.  In 2015 this point was 
reiterated in the Yates Memo that stated that organizations must provide DOJ with all of the 
relevant facts and cooperate with a DOJ investigation in order to be eligible for cooperation 
credit which is taken into consideration by U.S. attorneys’ when deciding whether or not to enter 
into a DPA.51 
D. Enron and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
                                                          
46 Sharon Finnegan, supra note 46. 
47 Id. at 661.  
48 See e.g. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. HSBC Bank, 2013 WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 
2102). 
49 Symposium, Too Big to Jail: Overcoming the Roadblocks to Regulatory Enforcement: Deferred Prosecution and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (2013). 
50 Id. at 1312 (pointing out that while concern about collateral effects was a concern for DOJ, the section of the 
Thompson Memo, (supra, note 26) that dealt with deferred prosecution agreements was under VI dealing with 
corporate compliance.)  
51 See Yates Memo, supra, note 24. 
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In the late 1990’s and early 200’s high profile accounting scandals brought down several 
large organizations that roiled markets and led Congress to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (“SOX”).52  SOX was designed to reform the way U.S. businesses operate and make it 
harder for officers to perpetuate the type of accounting fraud that led to the collapse of Enron and 
others.53  During Enron’s bankruptcy proceedings, it emerged that in-house and external counsel 
had raised concerns about the legality of specific transactions, but that these concerns were either 
dismissed by superiors or never made it up the reporting chain.  For example, in one instance 
several lawyers expressed concern to Ben Glisan, Enron’s financial officer, about an equity 
position that appeared to be in violation of SEC regulations.54  Glisan, however, confirmed 
“Enron’s confidence in Enron’s conclusions concerning the effect” of the position and 
effectively suppressed the matter.55  The lawyers’ suspicions were later vindicated when Glisan 
pled guilty to wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with that equity position.56 
Section 307 of SOX sets forth general guidelines governing attorneys working for public 
companies and instructs the SEC to implement rules mandating that attorneys report suspected 
material violations of securities law.57  Additionally, section 307 imposes investigatory 
obligations on the GC, or as the law identifies the position, the “Chief Legal Officer” (CLO).  
SOX requires attorneys to report “evidence of a material violation of the securities laws or 
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or an agent thereof,” to either the 
                                                          
52 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 
and 29 U.S.C.). 
53 148 CONG. REC. S10563 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
54 Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Exam’r, app. C, at 140-45, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034  
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 4, 2003). 
55 Id. 
56 Milton C. Regan, Jr., Ethics in Corporate Representation: Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1231 
(Dec. 2005).  
57 See 15 U.S.C. §7245. 
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CEO, or the CLO.58  Upon receiving a report of malfeasance from whom the regulations denote 
as the “reporting attorney,” the CLO must launch an inquiry into whether a violation has in fact 
occurred, or is about to occur.59  The CLO is required to take all reasonable steps to respond 
appropriately to the allegation and shall advise the reporting attorney of his or her actions and 
findings.60   
If after concluding the investigation, the CLO determines that no material violation has 
occurred or will occur, he or she is required to apprise the reporting attorney as to the basis of his 
or her conclusion.61  Importantly, the CLO may, in lieu of conducting an inquiry into the alleged 
malfeasance, “refer a report of evidence of a material violation to a qualified legal compliance 
committee,” so long as the committee had been constituted prior to the initial report.62  SEC 
regulations define a qualified legal compliance committee as a committee formed by a public 
company consisting of at least a member of the Board audit committee, or if none exists then a 
member of an equivalent Board of independent directors, and two or more members of the Board 
not employed by the company.63  The qualified legal compliance committee is tasked with, 
among other things, investigating suspected material violations of law and reporting findings to 
the CLO, CEO and the Board.  This committee exists to advise company leadership and ensure 
misconduct is adequately monitored 
If the reporting attorney perceives that the CLO or CEO has failed to provide a sufficient 
explanation as to why he or she concluded that no material violation has in fact occurred, that 
attorney is required to elevate his or her concern further “up the ladder.”64  SEC regulations 
                                                          
58 Id.  




63 Id. at §205.2(k). 
64 1d. at §205.3(b)(3). 
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provide that the reporting attorney shall report the evidence of the material violation to the 
Board’s audit committee, or some other Board committee comprised solely of external directors, 
or the Board itself, if no such committee of external directors exists.65   Additionally, the 
regulations define the “trigger for an attorney’s obligation to report up-the-ladder” as an 
objective, rather than subjective standard involving “credible evidence” that a material violation 
has occurred. 
 These statutes, regulations, and guidance, along with additional instructions from 
industry regulators form the basis of corporate compliance obligations and government 
oversight.  
III. The Role of the General Counsel  
The GC is the organization’s highest ranking legal counselor.  The GC’s  assists an 
organization to become more efficient and compliant, however, such involvement must not 
compromise the ability of the GC to “vigorously defend the organization after potential 
violations of the law have been identified.”66 
A. Dual Roles of Partner and Protector 
Today’s GC, and other in-house lawyers, have responsibilities far beyond providing legal 
advice to an organization.  The GC is involved with all aspects of an organization and often 
interacts directly with the Board and senior management as an advisor and a colleague.67  Former 
General Electric GC Ben W. Heineman, Jr. has identified the often conflicting dual roles that the 
                                                          
65 Id. 
66 J. Reginald Hill, Jenifer C. Peters, & Sheila W. Sawyer, The Relationship between Compliance Officer, In-House 
Counsel, and Outside Counsel: An Essential Partnership for Managing and Mitigating Regulatory Risk, AM. 
HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N. FRAUD AND COMPLIANCE FORUM 4 (Oct. 6-7 2014). 
67 Id. at 3. 
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GC plays as both a partner of business function leaders and guardian of the corporation’s 
integrity.68   
Senior managers often call upon the GC, who has the unique skill set acquired with a 
legal education, to aid in navigating and evaluating business decisions.  This can take the form of 
performing “traditional” legal activities, such as helping to negotiate deals or draft contracts, or 
can result in the GC acting in a business capacity, such as aiding leadership in making strategic 
decisions.69  Notably, business units increasingly call upon the GC to act as a “transaction 
facilitator.”70  The GC can help a Board structure business transactions, such as mergers or asset 
divestures, and provide legal perspective on how the deal will affect other segments of the 
organization.71  Given the complexity of modern business, it is typically advantageous and cost 
effective to involve in-house lawyers in projects early on.72  The degree to which the business 
side of an organization invites the GC to participate in strategic decision-making varies 
depending on the company and upon the GC relationship with his or he business colleagues.  
However, Heineman observes that business leaders embrace a GC who helps them to “get things 
done.”73   
The GC also acts as the guardian of a corporation’s reputation.  It is valuable for an 
organization to maintain a positive reputation in order to gain customers’ trust and, in theory at 
least, create value for shareholders.74  Customers rely on the reputation of an organization to 
                                                          
68 Ben W. Heineman, Jr., In the Beginning, CORPORATE COUNSEL 1 (April 2006).  
69 Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Caught in the Middle, CORPORATE COUNSEL 2 (April 2007).  
70 Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel on Promoting Corporate Integrity and 
Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 989, 1006 (2007) 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1007. 
73Ben W. Heineman, Jr., supra note 72.  
74 R. William Ide III & Douglace H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating Institution for an 
Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1127 (2003). 
4.19.16, Ostlund, Final Version  16 
 
make judgments about the quality of an organization’s products and services.75  The Board 
expects the GC to protect an organization’s reputation for trustworthiness by enacting controls to 
ensure “strict adherence to financial, legal and ethical rules.”76  Shareholders delegate the 
authority to monitor the operations and management of an organization to the Board.77  
Misconduct tarnishes the reputation of the organization and can lead to shareholders losing 
confidence in the Board.78 
Every level of an organization plays a role in ensuring compliance with the law and 
ethical norms.  The Board and the CEO are expected to establish a “tone at the top” that reflects 
a commitment to compliance.79  Despite its somewhat nebulous connotation, the government 
takes this expectation seriously.  Former SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman stated that 
improving the “tone at the top” of organizations was one of the five main goals of SOX when it 
was enacted in 2002.80   Because the GC has “comprehensive responsibility for the legal aspects 
of an entity’s operation,” it falls to him or her, along with the CCO, to implement systems to 
promote that tone at the top.81   
B. Challenges Facing Today’s GC 
In addition to the practical difficulties posed to a GC who subsists simultaneously in a 
legal and business capacity, these lawyers face legal and ethical challenges related to the scope 
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 Ben W. Heineman, Jr., supra note 71.  
77 Gregory Todd Jones, Trust, Institutionalization, & Corporate Reputations: Public Independent Fact-Finding 
From A Risk Management Perspective, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 121, 128 (2006). 
78 Id. 
79 Cynthia A. Koller, Laura A. Paterson, Elizabeth A, Scalf, When Moral Reasoning and Ethics Training Fail: 
Reducing White Collar Crime Through the Control of Opportunities for Deviance, 28 ND J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 
549, 507 (2014). 
80 Cynthia Glassman, SEC Comm’r, Remark’s Before the European Corporate Governance Summit: An SEC’s 
Commissioner’s View: The Post-Sarbanes Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers (March 2, 2005). 
81 Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integreity and 
Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 989, 1033 (2007). 
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of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege.  The Rules of Professional Responsibility 
maintain that it is incumbent upon the GC, and any other lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization, to recognize the organization as the client.82  The GC does not represent the 
constituents with whom he or she regularly communicates, including officers, directors, or the 
board.83  While this distinction may be understood by the GC and the constituents intellectually, 
in reality the demarcation can become obfuscated as personal relationships and loyalties among 
the parties develop.84  
One commentator notes that it may be “psychologic[aly] awkward” for the GC to  owe 
the organization professional allegiance, but have a duty to the individual manager with whom 
he or she works on a daily basis.85  This can further complicate confusion about the GC’s role 
with within an organization.  For example, it is not unusual for a GC to be involved in strategic 
planning or become a corporate director.  There are many benefits to the GC acting in such a 
dual capacity, however such a position can weaken the effectiveness of the GC as a manager and 
a lawyer.86  For example, if the GC is also on the Board, the Board’s ability to monitor the legal 
function becomes more difficult.87  At the same time, occupying this dual position increases the 
risk that attorney-client privilege will not attach to communications.  Privilege “covers only 
those communications made between the corporate lawyer and the client intended to be 
confidential and [that] are made for the primary purpose of obtaining legal advice or assurance, 
                                                          
82 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2003) (stating "a lawyer employed or retained by an organization 
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents”).  
83 Michael W. Peregrine & Joshua T. Buchman, Managing the General Counsel/ Compliance Officer Relationship, 
AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N CONNECTION, 34 (October 2011). 
84 Deborah A. DeMott, Colloquium: Ethics in Corporate Representation: The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 956 (Dec. 2005). 
85 Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate 
Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 194 (2001).   
86 Id. at 230. 
87 Id.  
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as opposed to business advice.”88  At a Board meeting, a GC/Board member can quickly slip into 
a situation where he or she simultaneously offers a business decision and a legal opinion.89  
Additionally, the Board can interpret a statement to be business advice, when it is in fact a legal 
opinion.90  For this reason, as the GC assumes a greater managerial role, he or she must exercise 
caution not to compromise privilege or give the false impression that privilege extends to 
conversations that do not in fact qualify. 
C. GC’s Reporting Requirements and Remembering that the Organization is the 
Client 
 
In 2003, the ABA House of Delegates updated the Model Rules to support greater 
corporate governance practices.91  The ABA amended Rule 1.13 to require a lawyer to report to a 
higher corporate authority malfeasance of which he or she becomes aware regardless of whether 
it relates to his or her reputation.92  Prior to the 2003 Amendment, Rule 1.13 only required a 
lawyer to report misconduct if the misconduct “was related to the [lawyer’s] representation.”93  
Under the current rule, a lawyer has greater reporting obligations designed to encourage him or 
her “to tack action to prevent or rectify corporate misconduct.”94  
These updates coincide with the passage of SOX and the imposition of section 307 
requirements mandating reporting suspect violations of law to the CLO, and Board.95  As 
discussed above, SOX draws lawyers across an organization and “requires them to go through 
                                                          
88 Id. at 239. 
89 Id. at 240. 
90 Id. at 241. 
91 See Report of the Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, SK083 ALI-ABA 99 (March 31, 2003), 
available at  http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/journal/119c.pdf   
92 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2003). 
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1993). 
94 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Preliminary Report of the Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, 58 
BUS. LAW. 1., available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=321701.  
95 15 U.S.C. §7245 
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the general counsel—unless the attorney reasonably believes that a report to the chief legal 
officer or to the chief legal officer and the CEO would be futile.”96 
In order for a GC to remain effective and objective, he or she must have the “sufficient 
status and independence” to recognize potential threats to the organization and take corrective 
action that may be adverse to senior management and the Board.97  The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct provide that when dealing with a corporate constituent whose interest the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is adverse to that of the organization, the lawyer must 
inform that party that he or she represents the organization.98   
Appropriately identifying the organization as the client is equally important when the 
GC, or other internal lawyer, is discussing legal matters with employees.99  Like any client, an 
organization can chose to waive privilege if it desires.  The ramifications of the failure to identify 
the organization as client is somewhat unclear, however, if privilege is challenged; it is in the 
best interest of the organization to produce a clear record of client identification.100 
A strong and independent GC is best equipped to avoid role confusion or the perception 
of impropriety.  Integration into the top echelons of an organization, along with unencumbered 
access to the Board, enables a GC to fulfil his or her obligations as business partner and guardian 
of a corporation’s reputation.  The duties of the GC are made ever less onerous when 
accompanied by personal relationships and unfettered contact with the Board.  
                                                          
96Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel on Promoting Corporate Integrity and 
Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 989,1028. 
97 Report of the Task Force in Lawyer’s Role in Corporate Governance, New York City Bar, 1, 96 (Nov. 2006). 
98MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 95.   
99 See Upjohn v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981) (Holding that communications between an organization’s 
employees and counsel, are privileged when the communication occurs for the purpose of obtaining legal 
information). 
100 See U.S. v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009) (Reversing a decision by the district court to grant defendant-
employee’s motion to suppress information on the grounds that while failure to disclose organization as client may 
violate the attorney’s rules of conduct, it does void privilege because that is determined by the content of the 
information). 
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IV. The Role of the Chief Compliance Officer 
At its most elemental, the CCO is responsible for developing the policies to ensure 
ethical and legally compliant behavior within a company, as well as procedures to detect, 
mitigate, and sanction ethical or legal malfeasance after it has occurred.101  The precise duties of 
the CCO vary across industries and companies, but generally, the CCO is delegated the proactive 
responsibility of implementing a compliance program composed of the elements of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the reactive function of monitoring for adherence to that program.102   
A. Background and Scope of Today’s CCO 
Understanding the different mentality of the two roles may be helpful to illustrate how 
the GC and CCO are distinct. One commentator noted that a corporate lawyer is trained and 
employed to craft the law to best serve his or her client.103  It is natural, therefore, for such a 
lawyer to resist cooperation with government, except perhaps if doing so will help him or her to 
mitigate a client’s penalty.104  Underlying compliance, is the obligation to report credible 
evidence of misconduct to the appropriate regulating agency.105  Therefore, while the CCO and 
the GC are similar, the CCO is focused on compliance detection, and resolution, whereas the 
GC’s “duty is to protect [an organization’s] liability profile.”106  
                                                          
101 Michael W. Peregrine, supra note 86. 
102 Jose A. Tabuena, The Chief Compliance Officer vs the General Counsel: Friend or Foe?, THE SOCIETY OF 
CORPORATE ETHICS 3 (Dec. 2006), 
http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/1/PDF/Resources/past_handouts/CEI/2008/601-3.pdf.  
103 See Christine Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehman Nielsen, The Two Faces of Lawyer: Professional 
Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulations, 22 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS, 201, 210-13 (2009). 
104 Id.  
105See e.g. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Mfrs., supra note 40 (stating that reporting must 
completed with 60 days of determining suspected misconduct). 
106 Kush Das, The Un-Privileged Industry: Assessing the Detriments of an Independent Compliance Office in 
Healthcare Fraud Litigation, 27 GEO. J. ETHICS 473, 475 (2014). 
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There is “a conventional assumption that a firm’s enforcement policies are designed to 
maximize its profit.”107  Government is able to shape corporate behavior by using laws and 
regulations and the respondeat superior standard of corporate liability to hold organizations 
civilly and criminally liable for employee and organization misconduct.108  Organizations defend 
against future enforcement by adopting preventive measures that deter agent misconduct.109 
Compliance programs have been around since the 1960s, however, in recent decades they 
have assumed greater prominence in reaction to increased prosecution and regulatory 
oversight.110  While in some respects the responsibilities of the compliance function overlap with 
that of the legal function, the roles are distinct.  Both the GC and CCO are responsible for 
ensuring an organization’s adherence to the law, however, the GC “provides legal advice on how 
the organization can comply with the law . . . [while the] CCO, by contrast, is a management 
function which incorporates legal considerations while influencing processes and practices of an 
organization.”111  In reality, the roles often intersect as both functions are involved with the 
creation and implementation of compliance programs and mitigating risk, however for reasons 
that will be discussed, understanding the boundaries of each respective function has important 
operational and legal consequences.112  One commentator recently opined that the CCO’s 
responsibilities extend beyond prevention and include an obligation to investigate and 
                                                          
107 Jennifer Arlen & Renier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability 
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U.L. REV. 687, 699 (1997). 
108 Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 973 (2009). 
109 Jennifer Arlen supra note 110, at 701. 
110 Miriam Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 87, 142 (2014). 
111 Jose A. Tabuena, supra note 105. 
112 J. Reginald Hill, supra note 69, at 4-5. 
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uncover.113  In perhaps an over simplification, he continued that “unlike the GC, [] the CCO’s 
job is to help ensure compliance, rather than just advise about it.”114  
The scope of a CCO’s authority varies across organizations and industries.  In addition to 
the healthcare and securities compliance, on which this paper is focused, many companies 
implement anti-trust, employment, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance programs.115  
For example, in Reserve Supply Corp., v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., the court held that 
the lower court properly granted summary judgment on claims of price fixing because the pricing 
was made pursuant to the organization’s anti-trust compliance program.116   
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is an anti-corruption law designed to 
prevent companies with ties to the U.S. from bribing foreign government officials.117  DOJ states 
that an effective compliance program is essential for compliance with FCPA, in particular to 
comply with the internal control provisions118 which set forth specific internal accounting 
controls for preventing bribery.119 
B. Expanded Compliance Duties under SOX and the Federal Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines 
 
In the finance sector, independent compliance functions developed in the 1960’s “out of 
securities firms’ need to receive advice and support concerning broad responsibility concerning 
day-to-day conduct of business unit activities” and have in place procedures to promote 
                                                          
113 Zane Gilmore, Understanding the Challenges of Consolidating the General Counsel and Corporate Compliance 
Officer, INSIDE COUNSEL (June 3, 2014),  http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/06/03/understanding-the-challenges-
of-consolidating-the. 
114 Id. 
115 Michele DeStefno, supra note 1, at 97. 
116 Reserve Supply Corp., v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 47 (7th Cir. 1992). 
117 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq (2012). 
118 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2) 
119 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & SEC, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 43 (2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.  
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compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.120  From these, and other nascent 
compliance functions, evolved rigorous compliance programs ordered toward protecting 
consumers, employees, and the public.121   The role of the CCO within a financial institution is 
particularly challenging because of the ever accelerating introduction of intricate financial 
products and the proliferation of complex laws and regulations enacted in response to the recent 
financial crises and scandals.122  These burdens, which have exponentially expanded compliance 
risks and obligations, are compounded by the linear trajectory of compliance budget increases.123  
In seeking to comply with the profusion of new requirements and best practices, the SEC 
encourages compliance officials not to become bogged down in minutia, but rather use their 
skills and experience to identify important issues and provide the firm and its employees with 
timely and constructive solutions.124 
Pursuant to its mandate in SOX, the Federal Sentencing Commission set forth the 
requirements of an effective compliance and ethics program.125  SOX specifically instructed the 
Commission to update the Federal Sentencing Guidelines such as to make them “sufficient to 
deter and punish organizational criminal misconduct.”126  Broadly, the Guidelines are intended to 
achieve two objectives.  First, they are intended to ensure that organizations sentenced for 
violation of the law are “justly punished.”127  Second, the Guidelines offer incentives for 
                                                          
120Sec. Indus. Ass’n Compliance & Legal Div., White Paper on the Role of Compliance 1 (2005). 
121 Code of Professional Conduct for Compliance and Ethics Professionals, Society of Corporate Compliance and 
Ethics. 
122 Sec. Indus. Ass’n Compliance & Legal Div, supra note 123, at n. 1. 
123 Daniel M. Gallagher, SEC Comm’r., Remarks at The Evolving Role of Compliance in the Securities Industry 
Presentation (May 12, 2014) https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541797850.  
124 Id. 
125 United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual § 8. B2., comment. (background). 
126 See 28 U.S.C. 994.   
127 Price Waterhouse Coopers, LLP, Best Practices and Practical Tips for Your Compliance & Ethics Program, 
Association of Corporate Counsel, Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Northeast Chapter 15 (2014) 
https://www.acc.com/chapters/ne/upload/Best-Practices-Practical-Tips-for-Your-Compliance-Ethics-Program-3.pdf. 
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organizations to detect and address violations and to put systems in place to help prevent future 
malfeasance.128  One report provided that “[o]rganizations can mitigate potential fines by as 
much as 95% by demonstrating that they have ‘effective’ compliance and ethics programs.” 129 
The Guidelines require organizations to delegate responsibility for compliance and ethics 
programs to specific “high-level personnel”.130  Additionally, the Guidelines instruct companies 
to assign employees “the day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics 
program,” with periodic reporting obligation to high-level personnel.131  Importantly, the 
Guidelines require that these designated individuals be given sufficient resources and authority to 
successfully carry out their compliance obligations.132  The Guidelines make it clear that to 
qualify for sentencing mitigation, the compliance function must actually be operational – 
supplied with sufficient resources and personnel who have a clear line of reporting to higher-
level personnel.133  DOJ reinforced this sentiment in the Yates Memo.134  It states that to be 
eligible for “cooperation credit, organizations must provide [DOJ] with all relevant facts about 
the individuals involved in the corporate misconduct.  The Guidelines, and the Yates Memo, fall 
short, however, of mandating how specifically organizations structure their compliance programs 
and/or their relationship to the GC.135 
The scope of the CCO’s duties, and the obligations of the compliance function that he or 
she oversees, varies by organization.  In some industries, for example financial services, the 
CCO typically has a developed understanding of the various business units, while in other 
                                                          
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual §§ 8B2.1(b)(2)(B)-(C). 
131Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Yates Memo, supra note 24, at 3. 
135 Id. 
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industries, “CCO’s may depend on so-called specialists in the business who have the 
responsibility to determine that the company is in compliance.”136  Increasingly, many 
compliance obligations are fulfilled by colleagues or external consultants located outside of the 
compliance function.137  Specialized compliance obligations, for example data privacy, are 
typically managed within specific operational functions, with the CCO providing oversight, but 
not direct managerial authority.138 
The Guidelines recognize the limitations that size and resources have on an organization.  
While smaller organizations are required to “demonstrate the same degree of commitment to 
ethical conduct and compliance with the laws as larger organizations,” they are expected to do so 
while devoting less resources.139  A smaller organization can demonstrate that organization’s 
commitment to ethical conduct by adopting simple procedures to accomplish obligations that, for 
a larger organization, could only be demonstrated by adopting a more formal processes.140  For 
example, large organizations are expected to develop programs and hire dedicated compliance 
and ethics personnel, whereas small organizations could meet the same requirements by 
conducting training through informal staff meetings and monitoring “through walk-arounds” 
conducted by business personnel.141  These comments simply reinforce that the Guidelines are 
less concerned about observing a specific compliance structure, than they are about promoting a 
more ethical corporate culture through expanded oversight. 
The CCO position is dynamic and uniquely straddles the legal and business worlds.  As 
the CCO role grows to meet increasingly complex requirements, so does the potential for the 
                                                          
136 Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, Moving Beyond the Baseline: Leveraging the Compliance Function to Gain and 
Competitive Edge, PWC STATE OF COMPLIANCE SURVEY 6 (2015) 
137 Id. at 7 
138 Id. 
139 United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1, comment. (n 2). 
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CCO to bring real value to his or her organization through mitigating the effect of illegal and 
unethical behavior.  
V. Compliance Obligations of the Board of Directors and Senior Management 
As discussed, compliance obligations and best practices come from a variety of sources. 
Caremark held that directors owe a fiduciary duty of care to the organization that requires, 
among other things, that the Board act in good faith to ensure that a proper system of oversight 
and reporting is in place.142  The specific form of the compliance program is a matter of business 
judgement, however, the failure of directors to oversee the adoption of an adequate system of 
reporting could expose the organization, and individual directors, to liability.143  
A. Director Duties 
The Caremark duties are impressive on paper, however in practice, they rarely lead to 
director liability.144  Companies and directors face far greater consequences under the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and from regulators, than they do under Caremark.145  In 
Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Caremark holding as the standard 
under Delaware corporate law.146  Citing Caremark, the court provided that “a claim that 
directors are subject to personal liability for employee failures is “possibly the most difficult 
theory in corporate law upon which a plaintiff may hope to win a judgment.”147 
                                                          
142 Caremark, supra note 8 (holding a “director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so 
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with 
applicable legal standards”). 
143 Id. at 971. 
144 See Mercer Bullard, supra note 13, at 20. 
145 Id.  
146 Stone, supra note 12, at 362. 
147 Id. at 369.  
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The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide directors with incentives for establishing 
and maintain an effective compliance program.148  Additionally, the promulgation of the Yates 
Memo put increased pressure on directors with its focus on individuals.149  The Memo makes 
clear that DOJ will not permit directors to leverage company settlements to allow the individual 
directors to escape criminal or civil liability.150  A corporate resolution will be permitted to serve 
a release for civil or criminal liability only under extraordinary circumstances and requires 
written approval from the relevant Assistant Attorney General.151 
 As with so many facets of compliance, CIAs and DPAs are fertile resources for 
discerning what the government deems important parts of an effective compliance apparatus.  
CIA’s typically have a section that enumerates the Board’s compliance obligations.  The 2015 
CIA that OIG entered into with Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. states that the Board, or a committee there 
of, has oversight authority over matters related to compliance with the federal health care 
program requirements.152  This obligation requires the Board to meet at least quarterly to review 
the company’s compliance program.153  Additionally, for each reporting period of the CIA, each 
member of the Board must sign a resolution attesting to oversight of the compliance program.154  
Industry leaders stress the importance of attracting directors with compliance 
backgrounds and encourage broader formation of “discrete compliance committees.”155  While 
dedicated compliance committees may be prevalent in certain industries, or among the largest 
                                                          
148 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 16. 
149 Yates Memo, supra note 24. 
150 Id. at 5. 
151 Id. 
152 See e.g. Daiichi Sankyo CIA, supra note 47, at 6. 
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155 Michael D. Greenberg, Culture, Compliance, and the C-Suite, RAND CENTER FOR CORPORATE ETHICS AND 
GOVERNANCE, 26 (2013). 
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sector participants, their existence is by no means ubiquitous.156  At a recent compliance 
symposium hosted by the RAND Corporation, one participant estimated that only around twenty 
percent of corporations in the United States have Board-level compliance committees, however 
he failed to state how many of the organizations had organizationally adopted that structure and 
how many did so to satisfy a settlement condition.157 
C. Management’s Reporting Obligations  
In addition to the fiduciary duties that all directors and senior management owe to the 
organization, SOX imposes on them more formalized reporting requirements.158  Currently the 
CEO and CFO of all publically traded companies must certify the accuracy of financial reports 
quarterly or annually.159  Additionally, those officers, or persons similarly situated, must attest to 
the existence of effective internal controls within the organization, and any deficiencies in their 
“design or operation” that could expose the organization to risk.160  The signing officers must 
certify that they have disclosed these deficiencies to the firm’s auditor and the Board’s audit 
committee.161  These requirements indicate that the personal liability of those with oversight 
authority, namely senior management and directors, is a serious and pervasive reality.162 
VI. CCO Reporting to GC 
The relationship between GC and CCO functions can be organized in a number of ways.  
Recently, there has been much discussion over the reporting relationship between the GC and 
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162 Stacey English & Susannah Hammond, Cost of Compliance 2015, THOMPSON REUTERS 8 (2015). 
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CCO, specifically whether the CCO should report to the GC, or whether the CCO should stand 
alone as a separate board-level reporting function.163   
The GC and CCO are linked regardless of the structural arrangement.  Conventional wisdom 
veers toward consolidating, or subordinating the CCO position, on the basis that compliance is 
largely a legal function and should, therefore, be situated within the legal department.164  
Oftentimes smaller organizations, lack the resources to employ both a GC and CCO, therefore, 
“as a practical matter one person must wear two hats.”165  In response to an increase in 
prosecutions and guidance166 from various government agencies, many organizations are 
revaluating both the one-person-two-hat model and the model whereby the CCO directly reports 
to the GC.167 
 Recent research identified a trend among some companies towards a more traditional 
hierarchical arrangement between the legal and compliance function motivated by logistics and 
complexity.168  In reaction to the increasingly burgeoning regulatory environment in which many 
companies do business, the legal and compliance functions are evermore entwined.  The GC’s 
access to the Board and senior management, and maybe even more so, his or her role as guardian 
of the corporation’s integrity169 elevates the GC to a unique position in the organization.170  The 
SEC expects the GC to leverage this station to promote compliance throughout the 
                                                          
163 J. Reginald Hill, supra note 69. 
164 Zane Gilmore, Understanding the Challenges of Consolidating the General Counsel and Corporate Compliance 
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organization.171  Consolidating oversight for the compliance function under the GC, where he or 
she can transition from advisor to architect, may better enable the GC to support compliance.  
Guidance provided in a joint publication of the American Health Lawyers Association (AHLA) 
and the OIG, recognizes that the ABA’s suggestion that the GC become more involved with the 
compliance function; this contradicts OIG’s guidance favoring separation of the functions.172  
Regardless of the reporting relationship between the GC and CCO, interaction and collaboration 
between the functions is inevitable and should be encouraged.   
While the potential for significant cost saving may prove a compelling enticement to a 
Board, there are serious risks in adopting a corporate structure whereby the GC and CCO are one 
individual, or whereby the CCO reports to GC.  First, confusion may arise when the GC is the 
CCO or is his or her supervisor because the company’s compliance goals may be at odds with 
the company’s legal objectives.173  For example, if a GC becomes aware of a constituent’s 
“legally problematic behavior,” he or she has an obligation to respond in a manner that protects 
the organization.174  This can conflict with the CCO’s obligation to identify the misconduct and 
put practices in place to prevent future misconduct.  If a GC “has direct charge over 
implementing a corporate compliance program, as opposed to involvement in designing the 
compliance programs and serving an educative role with the corporation with respect to these 
requirements,” he or she may be unable to be an effective and objective advocate for the 
corporation.175    
                                                          
171 Id. 
172 Office of Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of Heath and Human Servs. & Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 40, 
at 17. 
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Second, subordinating the CCO to the GC can lead to issues concerning the extent to which 
information and investigations are covered by the attorney-client privilege.176  Even when the 
COO is a standalone position reporting directly to the Board, the presence of both functions in an 
internal investigation may make it difficult to determine when information was obtained for “the 
purpose of obtaining legal advice,” or when information was simply obtained “pursuant to 
routine business polices or regulatory requirements.”177  Liberally invoking privilege risks 
raising the suspicion of regulators and inviting further investigation.178  Regulators also may 
move to compel production of materials, potentially rightly privileged, under the “crime-fraud” 
exception.179   
The crime-fraud exception is an exception to the attorney-client privilege that allows for 
the disclosure of information when the client uses or attempts to use the lawyer’s services to 
perpetrate or cover up a crime.180  Where the GC has oversight authority over the CCO, or serves 
simultaneously in both rules, he or she must be attentive to when he or she is 
acting/communicating in a legal capacity, or in compliance capacity.181     
Information obtained by a corporation during the course of an internal investigation for legal 
purposes is subject to the attorney-client privilege.182  One commentator remarked that “attorney-
client privilege is the still the primary evidentiary tool for maintaining the confidentiality of 
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177 J. Reginald Hill, supra note 69, at 10. 
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181 Edward T. Dartley, The Combined Role of the General Counsel and the Chief Compliance Officer – 
Opportunities and Challenges, PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, 
27 (2014). 
182 Theodore L. Lotchin, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished? Establishing A Self-Evaluative Privilege for Corporate 
Internal Investigation, 446 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1137, 1150 (2004).  
4.19.16, Ostlund, Final Version  32 
 
privileged documents.”183  If this privilege is challenged, the court will make a factual 
determination as to whether the information was truly produced as a result of qualifying 
confidential relationship.184  Since it can be hard for an “organization to predict and understand 
when the attorney-client privilege will apply,” it behooves the GC, and other internal attorneys, 
to make it clear when they are giving legal advice, and when they are just providing a 
perspective on a business decision.185  Involvement of compliance, or another business  function 
need not eschew the protections afforded by privilege, but in light of recent precedent,186 it 
should be made clear that the investigation is being “conducted by counsel,” for the “purpose of 
obtaining legal advice.”187  In the end, companies may choose to waive privilege in the interest 
offering transparent and to obtain cooperation credit to avoid  
Budget concerns, the desire for effective communication, and efficiency are legitimate 
reasons to subordinate the CCO to the GC or combine the functions.  However, short-term 
monetary gain should not blind an organization to the risk of the much costlier expense of future 
prosecution.  
VII. Standalone CCO and GC 
Currently, formal separation or the CCO and GC is not required by the SEC, HHS, or 
other government agencies. However, requirements imposed on companies in recent settlements 
demonstrate that separation is the preferred structure.   
A. Office of Inspector General 
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OIG enforces federal laws and regulations “enacted to prevent fraud and abuse in the 
healthcare industry.”188   OIG cannot bring criminal charges against an organization, but it can 
refer cases to DOJ and can impose civil monetary penalties under the Civil Monetary Penalties 
Law189, the Anti-Kickback Statute190 and the False Claims Act.191  OIG publishes compliance 
program guidance for organizations operating in many segments of the health care industry.192  
This guidance is intended to help organizations develop effective internal control to remain 
complaint with state and federal law.   
OIG guidance is not binding, but it provides an insight into preferred best practices.  
Many of the guidance documents include the same footnote stating that “OIG believes it is 
generally not advisable for the compliance function to be subordinate to the [pharmaceutical 
manufacturer’s, hospitals, clinical laboratory’s . . .] general counsel.”193  By separating the GC 
and CCO, “a system of checks and balances is established” helping organizations “more 
effectively achieve the goals of the compliance program.”194  
Further, OIG’s preference for the bifurcation of GC and CCO function is evident in the 
CIAs that it has entered into with offending organizations.  For example in 2006, Tenet 
Healthcare Corporation (Tenet) agreed to pay $900 million to resolve liability for violations of 
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the False Claims Act.195  Additionally, Tenet entered into a five year long CIA with OIG.196  The 
CIA required that Tenet implement and maintain a compliance program overseen by a CCO who 
is a senior member of management.197  The CIA stated that the CCO could not be or be 
subordinate to the CFO, CEO, or GC, and that the CCO must report directly to the Board.198  
Additionally, the CCO was required to deliver quarterly report to the Board on the status of the 
compliance program.199  These terms were not unique to the Tenet CIA200, and have continued to 
be commonly included subsequent in settlements.201   
The Tenent CIA, however included “unprecedented provision requiring the Quality, 
Compliance, and Ethic Committee of Tenent’s Board of Directors to undertake a review of the 
effectiveness of Tenent’s compliance program.”202  Additionally, the CIA included the 
requirement that Tenent submit annual reports certified by the company’s officers, that the 
organization was in compliance with Federal health care program requirements.203 
In 2012, OIG held a roundtable meeting with representatives from 32 organizations that 
entered into CIAs with OIG since 2009.204  With a focus toward future CIAs, OIG solicited 
feedback on, among other things, the role of the CCO.205  Participants expressed approval of the 
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requirement that the CCO report directly to the Board, and not the GC.206  Additionally, 
participants “stated the importance of having the compliance officer be a member of senior 
management.  These suggestions remain features of post-roundtable CIA’s207 
B. Department of Justice 
DOJ has likewise articulated a preference for separating the GC and CCO positions.  
DOJ, unlike OIG, is enforcing criminal law. As a result, their guidance is found in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines208 and DPAs209.  
Eligibility for sentence mitigation under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines requires 
“high-level personnel within the organization” to delegate day-to-day operational responsibilities 
to specific individuals.210  These individuals, in turn, are required to periodically report to the 
high-level personnel about the state of the compliance program.211  The Guidelines define high-
level personnel within the organization as those individuals in controlling or substantial policy-
related positions, including directors, the CEO, and other senior management.212  In mandating 
both high-level oversight and requiring that the staff operating the compliance program report 
directly to the Board, the updated Guidelines help to preserve an “independent voice, free of any 
potential filtering by senior organization mangers.”213   
The Guidelines stop short of mandating that the CCO be autonomous from the GC.  
However, many business leaders have highlighted the importance of preserving independent 
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communication between the CCO and the Board as a reason to split the functions.214  A CCO 
who controls the compliance budget and can make personnel decisions, and most importantly  
Additionally, as OIG has stated many times, a CCO who has direct access to the Board, is a 
“check” to an organization’s compliance efforts.215  
Like OIG, as a condition for settlement, DOJ requires that an organization’s CCO be a 
member of senior management who reports directly to the Board.216 
VIII. Conclusion 
Guidance from agencies articulates a clear preference for bifurcating the roles of CCO 
and GC.  This separation is not now, nor may it ever be, mandated by law, but business judgment 
and best practices dictate that the Board and senior management should seriously consider 
bifurcation and be ready to defend a decision to preserve the CCO in a subordinate positon to the 
GC.  
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